The amount of personal information involuntarily exposed by users on online social networks is staggering, as shown in recent research. Moreover, recent reports indicate that these networks are inundated with tens of millions of fake user profiles, which may jeopardize the user's security and privacy. To identify fake users in such networks and to improve users' security and privacy, we developed the Social Privacy Protector (SPP) software for Facebook. This software contains three protection layers that improve user privacy by implementing different methods to identify fake profiles. The first layer identifies a user's friends who might pose a threat and then restricts the access these ''friends'' have to the user's personal information. The second layer is an expansion of Facebook's basic privacy settings based on different types of social network usage profiles. The third layer alerts users about the number of installed applications on their Facebook profile that has access to their private information. An initial version of the SPP software received positive media coverage, and more than 3,000 users from more than 20 countries have installed the software, out of which 527 have used the software to restrict more than 9,000 friends. In addition, we estimate that more than 100 users have
accepted the software's recommendations and removed nearly 1,800 Facebook applications from their profiles. By analyzing the unique dataset obtained by the software in combination with machine learning techniques, we developed classifiers that are able to predict Facebook profiles with a high probability of being fake and consequently threaten the user's security and privacy. Moreover, in this study, we present statistics generated by the SPP software on both user privacy settings and the number of applications installed on Facebook profiles. These statistics alarmingly demonstrate how vulnerable Facebook users' information is to both fake profile attacks and third-party Facebook applications.
Introduction
In recent years, online social networks have grown rapidly and today offer individuals endless possibilities for publicly expressing themselves, communicating with friends, and sharing information with people across the world. A recent survey by Madden and Zickuhr (2011) estimated that 65 % of adult Internet users use online social network sites, such as Twitter, 1 LinkedIn, 2 Google?, 3 and Facebook. 4 As of December 2013, the Facebook social network had more than 1.23 billion active users monthly. 5 On average, adult Facebook users have 338 friends and more than half of adult Facebook users have more than 200 friends (Smith 2014) .
Moreover, according to the Social Media Report (Nielsen 2011), American Internet users spent more than 53.5 billion minutes on Facebook in the month of May 2011, making Facebook the leading web brand in the United States.
Due to the friendly nature of Facebook, users tend to disclose many personal details about themselves and their connections. These details can include date of birth, personal pictures, place of employment, email address, high school name, relationship status, and even phone number. Moreover, Boshmaf et al. (2011) discovered that an average of 80 % of studied Facebook users accepted friend requests from complete strangers if they had more than 11 mutual friends with that stranger. In many cases, accepting friend requests from strangers may result in the exposure of a user's personal information to harmful third parties. Additionally, the personal information of Facebook users can be shared with third-party Facebook applications (Egele et al. 2011) . Another privacy concern involves existing privacy settings, which for the majority of Facebook users do not match their security expectations (Liu et al. 2011) . These issues indicate that many users accidentally or unknowingly publish private information, leaving them more exposed than they might be aware.
If a user's personal information is disclosed to a malicious third party, it can be used to threaten the security of the user both online and in everyday life. For example, a malicious user can use the personal information accessed on the Facebook site to send customized spam messages in an attempt to lure the user onto malicious websites (Stringhini et al. 2010) , or the attacker might blackmail the innocent user into transferring money to the attacker's account (Nelson et al. 2009 ). To cover their tracks, social network attackers may use fake profiles. In fact, the number of fake profiles on Facebook is estimated to be in the tens of millions. According to a report (Facebook 2012) , Facebook estimates that 8.7 % (83.09 million) of its accounts do not belong to real profiles. Moreover, Facebook estimates that 1.5 % (14.32 million) of its accounts are ''undesirable accounts'' that belong to users who may deliberately spread undesirable content, such as spam messages and malicious links, and threaten the security and privacy of other Facebook users. In this study, we present the Social Privacy Protector (SPP) software for protecting user privacy on Facebook. The SPP software consists of two main components, namely a Firefox add-on and a Facebook application. These two components provide Facebook users with three different layers of protection. The first layer, a Facebook application, analyzes a user's friends list. Using simple heuristics (see Sect. 4.1), the application identifies which of the user's friends may be fake profiles and therefore impose a threat on the user's privacy. The application presents a convenient method for restricting the access of fake profiles to a user's personal information without removing them from the user's friends list. The second layer, which is a part of the Firefox add-on, enables Facebook users to easily control their profile privacy settings by simply selecting the most suitable privacy settings with just one click. The third layer, which is also a part of the software Firefox add-on, notifies users of the number of applications installed on their profile which may pose a threat to their privacy.
At the end of June 2012, we launched an initial version of the SPP software as ''free-to-use software'' (Fire et al. 2012a, b) and received massive media coverage with hundreds of online articles and interviews in leading blogs and news websites, such as Fox News (Bigos 2012) and NBC News (Popkin 2012) . Due to the media coverage, in less than four months, 3,017 users from more than 20 countries installed the SPP Facebook application, 527 of which used the SPP Facebook application to restrict 9,005 friends. 6 Moreover, at least 1,676 users installed the Firefox add-on, of which we estimate that 111 users used the add-on recommendation and removed more than 1,792 Facebook applications from their profiles (see Sect. 5.1). In addition, the add-on also succeeded in collecting the Facebook privacy settings of 67 different Facebook users .
Surprisingly, many of the SPP application users used the application to not only remove users that were recommended for removal, but to also manually search and restrict these users by name. This is because specific known friends have a higher likelihood of having profiles that belong to real people. The removal of real profiles also assisted us in studying and constructing classifiers that identified real profiles recommended for restriction. The collected data obtained from SPP users gave us a unique opportunity to learn more about user privacy on online social networks in general and on Facebook in particular. Also, using the unique data obtained from users restricting their Facebook friends, as well as by implementing machine learning techniques, we developed classifiers that can identify a user's friends recommended for restriction (see Sect. 4.2) . Our classifiers presented an area under the curve (AUC) of up to 0.947, precision at 200 of up to 98 %, and an average users precision at 10 of up to 24 % (see Sect. 5). Furthermore, these types of classifiers can also be used by online social network administrators to identify and remove fake profiles from the online social network. 6 Due to the unexpected number of downloads and high usage of the application, our servers did not succeed in supporting the massive number of users all at once. Moreover, in our initial version, the SPP Facebook application did not support all the existing web browsers. Therefore, many users who installed the SPP software were not able to use it on demand.
In this study, we also present statistics on Facebook user privacy settings, which were obtained by the SPP add-on. These statistics demonstrate how exposed Facebook users' personal information is to fake profile attacks and thirdparty applications (see Sect. 5.3) . For example, we illustrate that out of 1,676 examined Facebook users, 10.68 % have more than a hundred Facebook applications installed on their profile, and 30.31 % of the users have at least 40 Facebook applications installed. Moreover, out of 67 collected users' privacy settings, the majority of the user's personal information is available to friends, leaving the user's personal information exposed to fake friends.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner: In Sect. 2, we provide an overview of various related solutions that better help protect the security and privacy of social network users. In addition, we also present an overview of similar studies which used machine learning techniques to predict user properties, such as predicting users' links in social networks. In Sect. 3, we describe the SPP software architecture in detail. In Sect. 4, we describe the methods and experiments used in this study. We also describe the initial deployment of the SPP software and the methods used for the construction and evaluation of our machine learning classifiers. In Sect. 5, we present the results of our study, which include an evaluation of our classifiers and different users' privacy statistics obtained by the SPP software. In Sect. 6, we discuss the results obtained. Lastly, in Sect. 7, we present our conclusions from this study and offer suggestions for future research.
Related work
Various solutions have been developed to improve online social network privacy and security. In addition, ongoing research has utilized machine learning techniques to detect spammers and expose fake profiles on social networks like Facebook.
Online social network security and privacy solutions
The increasing number of threats to online social network users in recent years has prompted social network operators, security companies, and academic researchers to propose solutions to increase the security and privacy of network users. Social network operators have attempted to better protect their users by adding authentication processes to ensure that a registered user represents a real live person (Kuzma 2011) . Many social network operators, like Facebook, also offer their users a configurable user privacy setting that enables users to secure their personal data from other users in the network (Liu et al. 2011; Mahmood and Desmedt 2011) . Additional protection may include a shield against hackers, spammers, socialbots, identity cloning, phishing, and numerous other threats. For example, Facebook users have an option to report users in the network who harass other users in the network. 7 In addition, Facebook has also developed and deployed an immune system intended to protect its users from various online threats (Stein et al. 2011) .
Many commercial and open source products, such as Check Point's SocialGuard, 8 Websense's Defensio, 9 Rec-laimPrivacy, 10 and PrivAware 11 , offer online social network users tools for better protecting themselves. For example, the objective of Websense's Defensio software is to protect its users from spammers, adult content, and malicious scripts on Facebook. In recent years, several published academic studies have proposed solutions to the threats rampant on various social networks. DeBarr and Wechsler (2010) used the graph centrality measure to identify spammers. Wang (2010) presented techniques to classify spammers on Twitter based on content and graph features. To construct his classifier, Wang utilized 500 manually labeled Twitter accounts, which were divided into two classes of spam and non-spam, as a training set. He then applied the constructed classifier on 25,817 unlabeled Twitter accounts. Out of these tested accounts, the classifier pointed out 392 accounts as spammers, of which 348 (88.78 %) were found to be actual spammers after manual validation. Egele et al. (2011) presented PoX, an extension for Facebook, which makes all requests for private data explicit to the user. Yang et al. (2011) presented a method to identify fake profiles by analyzing different features such as the timestamp of a link's creation and the frequency of friend requests. Anwar and Fong (2012) presented the Reflective Policy Assessment tool, which aids users in examining their profiles from the viewpoint of another user in the network. Rahman et al. (2012a) presented the MyPage-Keeper Facebook application, which aims to protect Facebook users from damaging posts on the user's Facebook timeline. In a later study, Rahman et al. (2012b) also presented the FRAppE application for detecting malicious applications on Facebook. They discovered that 13 % of the 111,000 Facebook applications in their dataset were malicious applications. Furthermore, Fire et al. (2012c) proposed a method for detecting fake profiles in online social networks based on anomalies in a fake user's social structure.
In this study, we present the SPP software, which offers methods for improving Facebook user privacy. 12 Using data collected by the SPP software and machine learning techniques, we present methods for constructing classifiers that can assist in identifying fake user profiles.
Online social networks and machine learning
With the increasing popularity of social networks, many researchers have used a combination of data obtained from social networks and machine learning techniques to predict different user properties (Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg 2007; Altshuler et al. 2012; Sakaki et al. 2010 ). Furthermore, several studies used machine learning techniques to improve user security in online social networks (Stringhini et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2010; Fire et al. 2012c ). Stringhini et al. (2010) proposed a method for detecting spammer profiles using supervised learning algorithms. Stringhini et al scattered honey-profiles in Twitter and Facebook to lure spammers into revealing themselves by creating connections with the honey-profiles. All the profiles that connected to the honey-profiles were analyzed and manually labeled either as spammers or legitimate users. On Facebook, a classifier was constructed using 1,000 labeled profiles, out of which 173 profiles were identified as spam bots. Stringhini et al evaluated the constructed classifier on an unlabeled dataset consisting of 790,951 profiles, from which only 130 were classified as spammers.
In the same year, Lee et al. (2010) used machine learning and honeypots to uncover spammers in MySpace and Twitter. Sakaki et al. (2010) used machine learning and content data analysis of Twitter users in order to detect events such as earthquakes and typhoons in real time. Benevenuto et al. (2010) used behavior and content analysis to detect spammers on Twitter. They collected a dataset of 54 million profiles. To construct their classifier, they used a training set consisting of 8,207 manually labeled users, including 355 spammers and 7,852 nonspammers. Due to the high ratio of spammers to legitimate users, 710 of the legitimate users were randomly selected and included with the spammers in the training set. For the classification phase, they used a standard SVM classifier. They detected spammers with a true-positive rate of 70.1 % and a false-positive rate of 3.6 %. Another study that also used an SVM algorithm is the work of Nazir et al. (2010) . Nazir et al focused on detecting phantom profiles, i.e., profiles created with the purpose of gaining a strategic advantage in social games. By utilizing profile data and Facebook game activity data, they succeeded in constructing a phantom profiles detection classifier which presented a true-positive rate of 86.4 % and a false-positive rate of 13.4 %.
Recently, Altshuler et al. (2012) used machine learning techniques to predict different users' properties, such as origin and ethnicity, inside the ''Friends and Family'' social network, created by logs extracted from the user's mobile device. In the same year, Fire et al. (2012c) used online social network topological features to identify fake users in different social networks. To build training datasets, they simulated an infiltration of 100 fake users that were used as positive examples for the training phase. Using J48 decision tree classifiers, they were able to expose fake users with false-positive rates ranging from 1 to 5.2 % on three different social networks. More recently, Wang et al. (2013) presented a system for fake profile detection based on behavior analyzing of user clickstream. They used the user clickstream to generate features which were later used by a clustering algorithm, which divided the users into groups based on their behavior patterns. They evaluated their method on a LinkedIn real-world dataset that consisted of 40,000 profiles. From these profiles, their proposed algorithm marked 4,000 accounts as fake profiles, out of which about 1,700 (42.5 %) accounts were actually fake.
As part of this study, we present a method for recommending to a Facebook user which of his or her friends might be a fake profile and should, therefore, be restricted. Our method is based on properties of the connections between Facebook users and their friends and the use of supervised learning techniques. This type of problem is to some degree similar to the problem of predicting links between users in different social networks. The link prediction problem was studied extensively in recent years by various researchers who have offered a range of machine learning-based solutions (Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg 2007; Hasan et al. 2006; Cukierski et al. 2011; Fire et al. 2011) . Moreover, our method is even more similar to the problem of predicting link strength, studied by Kahanda and Neville (2009) and Xiang et al. (2010) , and to the problem of predicting positive and negative links (signed links), as studied by Leskovec et al. (2010) . In our study, we extract a different set of meta-content features, such as the number of pictures and videos in which both the user and his or her friends were tagged; this is similar to the study done by Kahanda and Neville. We also predict the type of negative relationships between users, which is similar to the study by Leskovec et al. However , the objective of our study is to uncover fake profiles rather than identify the link sign or strength between two users. In addition, our study is in contrast to other studies that used a major part of the social network topology to construct classifiers (Kahanda and Neville 2009; Leskovec et al. 2010; Fire et al. 2012c ): We construct our classifiers using only variations of the data collected in real time from the user's point of view rather than data collected from the social network administrator's point of view. Using this method, we were able to quickly analyze, in real time, each user's friends list with fewer resources and without invading the privacy of the user's friends.
Social privacy protector architecture
To better protect the privacy of Facebook users, we developed the Social Privacy Protector software. The SPP software consists of three main parts (see Fig. 1 ), which work in synergy: (a) Friends Analyzer Facebook Application, which identifies a user's friends who may pose a threat to his or her privacy; (b) SPP Firefox Add-on, which analyzes the user's privacy settings and assists in improving privacy settings with just one click; and (c) HTTP Server, which analyzes, stores, and caches software results for each user. In the remainder of this section, we describe in detail each individual part of the SPP software. Additionally, we present our ethical considerations while conducting this study.
Friends analyzer Facebook application
The Friends Analyzer Facebook application (also referred to as SPP application) is responsible for analyzing a user's friends list to determine which of the user's friends may pose a threat to the user's privacy. After the user installs the Friends Analyzer application, the application scans the user's friends list and returns a credibility score for each one of the user's friends. Each friend's score is created using simple heuristics or a more sophisticated machine learning algorithm that takes into account the strength of the connection between the user and his or her friends. The strength of each connection is based on different connection features; for instance, the number of common friends between the user and each friend, or the number of pictures and videos the user and each friend were tagged in together (see Sect. 4) . At the end of the process, the user receives a web page that includes a sorted list of all friends according to each friend's score, where the friends with the lowest scores and the highest likelihood of being fake profiles appear at the top of the list (see Fig. 2 ). The user has the ability to restrict a friend's access to the user's private information by simply clicking the Restrict button associated with each friend in the sorted list. Moreover, the application provides the user with an interface to view all friends alphabetically and easily restrict access to any potentially fake profile with a single click. This option enables Facebook users to protect their privacy not only from fake profiles but also from real profiles, such as exspouses, whom they do not want to have access to the personal data stored in their Facebook profile.
Social privacy protector Firefox add-on
The Social Privacy Protector Firefox Add-on (also referred to as Add-on) is responsible for improving user privacy settings with just a few simple clicks. After the Add-on is installed on the user's Firefox browser, it begins to monitor the user's Internet activity. When the Add-on determines that the user has logged onto his or her Facebook account, it then analyzes the number of applications installed on the user's Facebook profile. Next, it provides the user with a warning as to the number of installed applications which may pose a threat to the user's privacy (see Fig. 3 ). The Add-on also identifies the top two results obtained by the Friends Analyzer Facebook application and suggests which friends to restrict (see Fig. 3 ).
The Add-on also detects when the user has entered Facebook's privacy settings page and provides the user with three new privacy setting options. The new privacy settings are based on the user's profile type and can be modified with one click (see Fig. 4 ) instead of the more complex Facebook custom privacy settings that may contain up to 170 options (Anwar and Fong 2012) .Using the new Add-on privacy settings, a user can simply choose the profile type most suitable out of three options: (a) Celebrity setting-all of the user's information is public; (b) Recommended setting-the user's information is only public to friends, but some of the user's details, such as profile name is only open to the user's friends, and only friends of friends can apply for friend requests. Using this Add-on, users can easily control and improve their privacy without contacting a security expert. Moreover, parents can simply install this Add-on to their children's Facebook accounts in order to better protect their children's privacy without needing to completely understand all of Facebook's different privacy setting options. The SPP Add-on can also easily customize privacy settings by adding more options for different types of users. In this study, we utilized users' data collected by the Add-on to further study the privacy settings of Facebook users.
HTTP server
The HTTP server is responsible for connecting the SPP Firefox Add-on to the SPP Facebook application. When a user installs the SPP software, the server analyzes the user's friends list and identifies which of the user's friends may pose a threat to his or her security. To enhance the application's performance, the HTTP server caches parts of the analyzed results. In order to protect the user's privacy, the application stores only the minimal number of features in an encrypted manner using RC4 encryption with a 512 bit key, which is considered quite safe (Paul and Maitra 2011) .
Ethical considerations
During this study, we collected personal data from the SPP users that in some cases might be considered sensitive. Therefore, to perform this study ethically, we have taken the following steps: First, upon installation, we ask for the users' consent to access their personal data using the SPP software. Second, we have publicly published our software terms of use 13 and privacy policy, 14 viewable both on our official Social Privacy Protector website 15 and upon application installation. Third, even though our SPP software was given access to users' personal and sensitive data to assist us in better identifying fake profiles, we chose to predominantly extract metadata features. The reason for this was to avoid compromising SPP users' privacy in the event that our dataset was itself compromised. Lastly, to protect the users' privacy, the application stores only the minimal number of features in an encrypted manner using RC4 encryption.
Methods and experiments
In this study, our experiments were divided into two main parts. In the first part, we deployed an initial version of the SPP software in order to improve user privacy on Facebook. We also used the initial version to collect data on each SPP user and his or her links. The main focus of this part was on the calculation of the heuristic that sorts the friends list and recommends which friends to restrict. Additionally, we determined methods for analyzing the user privacy setting data collected by the Add-on to better evaluate Facebook user privacy settings and understand how much users are exposed to various security threats, such as personal information exposure to fake friends.
In the second part of our experiments, we used the data previously collected to learn more about Facebook users' privacy settings. Furthermore, we used the collected data to develop machine learning classifiers that can identify those Facebook profiles with higher likelihoods of being fake. These classifiers can replace the initial SPP heuristic with a more generic model, which can provide SPP users with recommendations on which friends to restrict. In this part, our main focus was on the construction of the machine learning classifiers and the evaluation of their performances. We conclude with the detailed methods used to gather and analyze our data.
Deployment of social privacy protector: initial version
After developing the SPP software according to the architecture described in Sect. 3, a heuristic was fashioned that could quickly sort the friends list of each SPP user. In the initial version, we developed the heuristic to be as simple as possible and based it upon the hypothesis that most fake users do not have strong connections with real users. To estimate the strength of a connection between two users, we extracted lists of features and calculated a simple arithmetic heuristic. The primary purpose of the heuristic was not to identify fake profiles in an optimal way, but to create a reasonable friend connections strength heuristic with fast computational speed. This heuristic assisted us in collecting tagged data about friend profiles that the SPP users had restricted. Using the collected data, we then developed more sophisticated classifiers using machine learning algorithms (See Sect. 4.2). The heuristic's main constraint was that for every SPP user, it needed to analyze and evaluate hundreds or even thousands of connection strengths between the user and each one of his or her friends in a short period of time. Moreover, the heuristic needed to take into consideration the performance of the Facebook application API 16 in its calculation time of each feature. Additionally, due to privacy considerations, we preferred not to extract any content features, which by their nature may contain more private information. After testing and evaluating various features on a limited number of users, we decided to extract the following features mostly inspired by the study of Kahanda and Neville (2009) , for each SPP user (referred as u), and each one of his or her friends (referred as v):
1. Are-Family(u, v)-the identification of u and v as defined in Facebook as being in the same family. The Are-Family feature prevents cases in which the SPP application will mark a family member as a fake profile. 2. Common-Chat-Messages(u, v)-the number of chat messages sent between u and v. We assume that in most cases, such as in a fake profile used to send spam messages, there will be no chat interaction between the user and the fake profile. However, when there are different types of fake profiles, such as fake profiles used by cyber predators, this feature will be less helpful in identifying the threat.
3. Common-Friends(u, v)-the number of mutual friends both u and v possess. The relevance of the Common-Friends feature is very intuitive. It is expected that the larger the size of the common neighborhood, the greater the chances are that the friendship between the users is real. The Common-Friends feature was previously used to solve different versions of the link prediction problem (Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg 2007; Kahanda and Neville 2009; Leskovec et al. 2010; Fire et al. 2011 Fire et al. , 2013 and was found to be a very useful feature in many of these scenarios. 4. Common-Groups-Number(u, v)-the number of Facebook groups in which both u and v are members. It is expected that the higher the number of common groups, the greater the chances are that u and v have similar fields of interest, which might indicate that the friendship between u and v is real. The Common-Groups-Number feature was used in the study of Kahanda and Neville (2009) to predict link strength. 5. Common-Posts-Number(u, v)-the number of posts both u and v posted on each other's wall in the last year. Similar post features were studied by Kahanda and Neville (2009) and were discovered to be very useful in predicting strong relationships between two Facebook users. 6. Tagged-Photos-Number(u, v)-the number of photos in which both u and v were tagged together. We assume that most fake profiles have almost no shared tagged photos with the user. The Tagged-Photos-Number feature was also used in the Kahanda and Neville (2009) study. 7. Tagged-Videos-Number(u, v)-the number of video clips in which both u and v appeared together. As in the case of tagged photos, we assume that most fake profiles have almost no shared tagged video clips with the user. 8. Friends-Number(u) and Friends-Number(v)-the total number of friends u and v have. These features are usually referred to as the degree of u and the degree of v and were extracted from each user to assist us in improving the supervised learning classifiers, as described in Sect. 4.2. However, we did not use this feature when calculating the Connection-Strength heuristics in SPP's initial version.
In an attempt to build better fake profile prediction heuristics, we also tested the following features: (a) the number of Facebook likes both u and v gave to each other, and (b) the number of comments both u and v posted on each other's wall posts. However, although these two features seemed promising in assisting us in identifying fake profiles, we did not use them in the end due to performance issues and time-consuming calculations that did not produce real-time results.
After several tests and simple evaluations on a limited number of users, we decided to use the following simple heuristic to define the Connection-Strength function between a user u and a friend v:
In order to advise SPP users as to which friends should be restricted, we ranked each user's friends list according to the Connection-Strength(u,v) function. Due to Facebook's estimations that 8.7 % of all Facebook users are not real profiles (Facebook 2012 ) and due to the study of Fire et al. (2012c) which empirically demonstrated that in some online social networks the number may be even higher, we presented each SPP user with the top 10 % of his or her friends who received the lowest Connection-Strength score (see illustration in Fig. 2) .
To evaluate the performance of the Connection-Strength heuristic, we calculated three statistics on the heuristic's performances in restricting friends.
First, we calculated the heuristic's restricting precision for different Connection-Strength values. This calculation was performed by measuring, for different Connection-Strength values, the ratio between the number of friends who were restricted and the total number of friends who received the exact Connection-Strength value. Formally, for each i 2 fCSðu; f Þju 2 Users^f 2 friendsðuÞg, we defined the heuristic's restricting precision at i as follows:
where Users is a set which contains all SPP users, friendsðuÞ is a set which contains all of u's Facebook friends, and rðu; f Þ is a binary function which returns 1 if a user u had restricted his friend f or 0 otherwise. Second, we calculated the restriction rates according to the friends' ranking positions in the restriction interface. This calculation was performed by measuring the percentage of friends restricted in each position in the restriction interface. A formal arithmetical definition of the heuristic's precision at rank position n, for each n 2 ½1; maxðffriends-numberðuÞju 2 UsersgÞ, is as follows:
where the function max(S) returns the maximum value among set S members, and the function rankðu; f Þ returns the ranking position which f appeared in u's restriction interface.
Lastly, we also calculated the heuristic's average users precision at k for different k values, in the following manner. First, for each SPP user u that had at least k friends, we calculated the user's Connection-Strength average precision at k. This was done by selecting k friends who received the lowest Connection-Strength values with u out of all u's friends. 17 We then calculated the ratio between the number of friends u had restricted among the selected friends and k. After we finished calculating the Connection-Strength average precision at k for each user u, we then continued to calculate the heuristic's average users precision at k by simply adding up all the users' Connection-Strength average precisions at k, and dividing the sum by the number of users with at least k friends. A formal arithmetical definition of the heuristic's average users precision at k is as follows:
where P u ðkÞ is defined as the heuristic's precision at k for a user u: P u ðkÞ :¼ R ff 2friendsðuÞj9f1;:::;fnÀk2friendsðuÞ;8j2½1;::;nÀkCSðf Þ ! CSðfjÞg rðu; f Þ k :
The goal of the presented Connection-Strength heuristic was not to identify fake profiles in an optimal way, but rather to make Facebook users more aware of the existence of fake profiles and of the fact that these types of profiles can threaten their privacy. Additionally, we wanted to collect a unique dataset that would contain labeled profiles with high likelihoods of being fake profiles.
In addition to collecting meta-content features through the SPP application, the SPP Firefox Add-on also collected the following user-defined privacy settings each time the user used the Add-on: By analyzing and monitoring the privacy settings, we can learn more about the SPP user's privacy settings on Facebook. In addition, we can estimate how vulnerable Facebook users' information is to fake profile attacks. Furthermore, by analyzing the collected privacy settings, we can also identify other potential privacy risks, which are common to many users.
Supervised learning
After we had deployed the SPP software and gathered enough data on which friends SPP users had restricted or not, our next step was to use supervised learning techniques 17 In case more than k friends received the lowest Connection-Strength values, we randomly removed friends with the highest Connection-Strength values, until we were left with exactly k friends.
to construct fake profile identification classifiers. To construct the fake profile identification classifiers, we first needed to define the different datasets and their underlying features. Next, we used different supervised learning techniques to construct the classifiers. Lastly, we evaluated the classifiers using various evaluation methods and metrics.
In the remainder of this section, we describe, in detail, the process of constructing and evaluating our classifiers. First, in Sect. 4.2.1, we describe how we defined the different datasets and their features. Second, in Sect. 4.2.2, we describe which methods were used to construct our classifiers and evaluate their performance.
Datasets and features
The initial version of the SPP application collected and calculated various details about each connection between a SPP user and each one of his or her friends in real time (see Sect. 4.1). Moreover, the SPP application presented the user with two interfaces for restricting friends. The first restriction interface (referred to as the recommendation interface) presented the user with a list of the 10 % of his or her friends who received the lowest Connection-Strength score. The second restriction interface (referred to as the alphabetical interface) presented the user with all friends in alphabetical order. Using these two restriction interfaces, we defined four types of links sets, two unrestricted links sets and two restricted links sets:
1. All unrestricted links set-all the links between the application users and their Facebook friends who were not restricted by the application. 2. Recommended unrestricted links set-all the links between the application users and their Facebook friends who were recommended for restriction by the application due to a low Connection-Strength score, but who were not restricted by the user. 3. Recommended restricted links set-all the links between the application users and their Facebook friends who were recommended for restriction by the application due to a low Connection-Strength score and who were restricted by the user. 4. Alphabetically restricted links set-all the links between the application users and their Facebook friends who were not recommended for restriction by the application. However, the user deliberately chose to restrict them using the alphabetical interface. 18
Using the above links sets, we defined the following three datasets:
1. Fake-profiles dataset-all the links in the Recommended unrestricted links set and in the All unrestricted links set. Namely, this dataset contains all friends who were restricted due to a relatively low Connection-Strength and all friends who were not restricted. Therefore, we believe that this dataset is suitable for constructing classifiers to identify fake profiles that the user needs to restrict. 19 We believe that this dataset is suitable for replacing the Connection-Strength heuristics with a generic classifier that recommends to a SSP user which friends to restrict. In addition, the classifiers constructed from this type of dataset can assist online network administrators in identifying fake profiles across the entire network.
Friends-restriction dataset-all the links in the
Alphabetically restricted links set and in the All unrestricted links set. Namely, this dataset contains all the friends who were not restricted and all the friends who were restricted deliberately by the user, although their restriction was not recommended by the SPP application. Therefore, we believe that this dataset is suitable for constructing classifiers to predict which friends the user prefers to restrict. 3. All-links dataset-all the links in all four disjoint links sets. According to the dataset definition, this dataset is the largest among all defined datasets. We believe that, like the Fake-profiles dataset, this dataset can be suitable for replacing the Connection-Strength heuristics with a generic classifier which can recommend to a SPP user which friends to restrict. For each link in the above-defined links datasets, the SPP application calculated all of the eight first link features defined in Sect. 4.1 in real time, including the Friends-Number(v) 20 (referred to as the Friend Friends-Number). In addition, whenever it was arithmetically possible, we also calculated the following set of seven features:
1. Chat-Messages-Ratio(u,v)-the ratio between the number of chat message u and v sent to each other, and the total number of chat messages u sent to all of his or her friends. The formal Chat-Messages-Ratio definition is:
18 If a restricted user's friend was presented in the recommendation interface and was restricted using the alphabetical interface, the link between the user and the restricted friend was assigned to the recommended restricted links set. 19 There can be cases in which SPP users choose to restrict Facebook friends who are legitimate Facebook users but received low Connection-Strength scores. Nevertheless, according to the Fake profiles dataset definition, and due to the SPP software's original purpose, we assume that in most cases, the SPP users indeed chose to restrict fake profiles. 20 In some cases, we were not able to extract the user's (v) friends number probably due to the v's privacy settings.
Chat-Messages-Ratioðu; vÞ
where friendsðuÞ is defined as a set which contains all the friends of u. Common-Video-Ratioðu; vÞ :¼ CommonÀVideoÀNumberðu; vÞ P f 2friendsðuÞ Common-Video-Numberðu; f Þ 6. Is-Friend-Profile-Private(v)-in some cases, the SPP application did not succeed in collecting v's friends number (Friends-Number(v)) yet succeeded in collecting the Common-Friends(u,v) value, which returned a value greater than zero. This may indicate that v's profile was set to be a private profile. With these cases in mind, we defined the Is-Friend-Profile-Private function to be a binary function, which returns true values in case the application did not succeed in collecting v's friends number but succeeded in collecting the Common-Friends(u,v) with a value greater than zero, or a false value otherwise. 7. Jaccard's-Coefficient(u,v)-Jaccard's-Coefficient is a well-known feature for link prediction (Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg 2007; Kahanda and Neville 2009; Fire et al. 2011 Fire et al. , 2013 . The Jaccard's coefficient is defined as the number of common-friends u and v have divided by the sum of distinct friends both u and v have. The formal Jaccard's-Coefficient definition is:
Jaccard 0 s-Coefficientðu; vÞ :¼
CommonÀFriendsðu; vÞ Friends-NumberðuÞ þ Friends-NumberðvÞ-Common-Friendsðu; vÞ
A higher value of Jaccard's-Coefficient denotes a stronger link between two Facebook users.
Classifiers construction and evaluation
Using the three datasets and the 15 features defined in the previous sections, we constructed classifiers for fake profile identification and for recommending profiles for restriction. The process of constructing and evaluating the different classifiers follows.
First, we matched the suitable datasets for each type of classification mission in the following manner: (a) for identifying fake profiles, we used the Fake-profiles dataset, (b) for recommending real profiles for restriction, we used the Friends-restriction dataset, and (c) for recommending to SPP users of which real and fake friends to restrict, we used the All-links dataset. Next, for each link in each one of the datasets, we extracted the 15 features defined in Sects. 4.1 and 4.2.1, and we created a vector set for each link. Furthermore, we added an additional binary target feature to each link's features vector set that indicates whether the link between the SPP user and a friend was restricted by the SPP user. Due to the fact that the majority of the links in each dataset had not been restricted, these datasets were overwhelmingly imbalanced with restricted links as a minority class. Therefore, a naive algorithm that always predicts ''not restricted'' will present good prediction precision.
To overcome the datasets' imbalance problem, we used an undersampling methodology similar to that used by Guha et al. (2004) to predict trust and by Leskovec et al. (2010) to predict positive and negative links. According to this methodology, we transformed each imbalanced dataset into a balanced dataset by combining all the restricted links in each dataset and adding to them an equal number of randomly selected unrestricted links from each dataset. Afterward, we used the balanced datasets with the updated extracted links' features vector sets to construct several classifiers using WEKA (Hall et al. 2009 ), a popular suite of machine learning software written in Java and developed at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. We used WEKA's C4.5 (J48), IBk, Naive-Bayes, Bagging, Ada-BoostM1, RotationForest, and RandomForest implementations of the corresponding algorithms. In addition, we used the simple OneR classifier as a baseline for the performance of the other classifiers. For each of these algorithms, most of the configurable parameters were set to their default values with the following exceptions: for C4.5, the minimum number of instances per leaf parameter was between the values of 2, 6, 8, and 10; for IBk, its k parameter was set to 5 and 10. The ensemble methods were configured as follows: The number of iterations for all ensemble methods was set to 100. The Bagging, Ada-BoostM1, and RotationForest algorithms were evaluated using J48 as the base classifier with the number of instances per leaf set to 4, 6, 8, and 10. The RandomForest classifier's number of trees to build parameter was set to 100. Next, we evaluated our classifiers using the common tenfold cross-validation approach. We used the area under curve (AUC), F measure, false-positive rate, true-positive rate, and training time 21 to evaluate the different classifiers' performances. Additionally, in order to obtain an indication of the usefulness of the various features, we also analyzed their importance using WEKA's information gain attribute selection algorithm.
Furthermore, in order to evaluate the classifiers' recommendations precision at top k (precision@k), we selected the machine learning algorithm that presented the highest AUC in the above evaluations, and we used two evaluation methods to measure the performance of the algorithm on the different datasets. In the first evaluation method, we split our datasets into training sets and testing sets. For each one of the three balanced datasets, we randomly split each dataset into a training dataset, which contained two-third of the labeled instances, and a testing dataset, which contained one-third of the labeled instances. Then, we constructed classifiers using the training dataset only. Next, we used the classifiers to classify the profiles in the testing dataset and sort the instances according to the classifiers' prediction probabilities in descending order, where the links that received the highest probability of being restricted were first. We then evaluated the precision of the classifiers' predictions for the top k predictions, for different values of k.
In the second evaluation method, our goal was to measure the classifiers' recommendations average users precision at k. To achieve this goal, we used the following method. First, we selected one user out of all SPP users. Then, we created a training dataset using all SPP users' links without the selected user's links. Next, we balanced the training dataset using the same undersampling method described above. Then, we constructed a classifier using the training dataset and used the selected user's links as a testing dataset. We used the constructed classifier to predict the probability of restriction for each link in the selected user's links. We then sorted the classifier's predictions in descending order, where the links that received the highest probability of being restricted were first. Subsequently, we measured the classifier's predictions precision for different k values. Lastly, we repeated this process for each one of all the SPP users and calculated the average classifiers' precisions for different k values.
Using these evaluation methods, we were able evaluate how precise our classifiers were in recommending which friends to restrict, both from the SPP user's point of view and from the online social network administrator's point of view.
Results
The initial version of the SPP software was formally launched at the end of June 2012 as free-to-use software (Fire et al. 2012a, b) . Due to extensive media coverage, 3,017 users from more than 20 countries installed the SPP application from June 27 to November 10, 2012. Out of this number, 527 users used the SPP application to restrict 9,005 friends, with at least one friend restricted for each user. In addition, more than 1,676 users had installed the SPP Firefox Add-on and removed at least 1,792 applications.
In the remainder of this section, we present the results obtained from analyzing the collected SPP software data. First, in Sect. 5.1, we present the datasets obtained by the SPP application. Afterward, in Sect. 5.2, we give the results obtained by our machine learning classifiers. Lastly, in Sect. 5.3, we present statistics on the success of our Add-on to assist Facebook users in removing unneeded applications from their profiles. In this section, we also show various statistics about Facebook user privacy settings obtained from the SPP Add-on.
Collected datasets
As anticipated, the SPP application successfully prompted users to remove friends with low Connection-Strength scores. Surprisingly, 355 of the SPP users used the application not only to remove friends who had received scores but also to search and restrict specific friends profiles by name that were likely real profiles.
Using the collected users' data, we created three datasets as described in Sect. 4.2.1 (see Table 1 ). The first dataset was the Fake-profiles dataset; this dataset contained 141,146 links, out of which the 434 SPP users had restricted 2,860 links (2.03 % of all links) recommended by the SPP application. The second dataset was the Friends-restriction dataset; this dataset contained 144,431 links, out of which the 355 users had restricted 6,145 links (4.25 % of all links) that were specifically chosen for restriction by the users using the alphabetical interface. The last dataset was the All-links dataset, which contained 147,291 links, out of which 9,005 (6.11 % of all links) were restricted. As expected, all three datasets were overwhelmingly imbalanced with imbalance rates ranging from 2.03 to 6.11 %.
To better understand the differences between the restricted links features and the unrestricted links features, we calculated the average value of each extracted feature in each dataset for each link type (see Table 2 ). It should be noted that in all the examined features, except for the Friend Friends-Number and Is-Friend-Profile-Private features, the restricted links features received a lower average than the unrestricted links features in each dataset.
To understand how well the Connection-Strength heuristic performed, we calculated, as described in Sect. 4.1, the heuristic's restricting precision for different Connection-Strength values (see Fig. 5 ), the heuristic restriction rates according to the friends ranking positions in the restriction interface (see Fig. 6 ), and the heuristic's average users precision at k for different values of k (see Fig. 7) .
Although the Connection-Strength heuristic was quite simple, it presented an average users precision of 33.6 % at 1, an average users precision of 27.1 % at 10, and an average users precision of 11.1 % at 100 (see Fig. 7 ). In addition, 31.7 % of the friends who appeared in the second position in the restriction interface due to a low Connection-Strength score were actually restricted by the SPP users (see Fig. 6 ). Furthermore, 28 % of the SPP users' friends who received a Connection-Strength of 0 were also restricted (see Fig. 5 ). However, the friends' restriction rates sharply declined when the Connection-Strength score increased. For example, only 10 %, of the users' friends who received a Connection-Strength equal to 3 were actually restricted.
Classifier results
From the three imbalanced datasets, we created three balanced datasets using all the restricted links in each dataset and randomly choosing an equal number of unrestricted links. We then used the balanced dataset and evaluated the specified machine learning algorithms (see Sect. 4.2.2) using a tenfold cross-validation approach. The evaluation results of the different classifiers are presented in Fig. 8 and in Table 3 . It can be seen that on all datasets, the RotationForest classification algorithm presented the best AUC results among all the ensemble classifiers, and the J48 decision tree classification algorithm presented the best results among all the nonensemble classifiers. In addition, it should be noted that on all datasets, the RotationForest classifier presented considerably better results than the simple OneR classifier, which we used as a baseline.
After we discovered that the RotationForest classifier presented the best overall results, we evaluated the Rota-tionForest classifier precision at k for different values of k in the different datasets. We first calculated the classifier precision for different k values by splitting each dataset into two datasets: a training dataset, which contained twothird of the links, and a testing dataset, which contained one-third of the links. The results of this precision at k evaluation are presented in Fig. 9 . It should be noted that the RotationForest classifiers presented precisions at 200 of 98, 93, and 90 % for the Friends-restriction dataset, Fakeprofiles dataset, and All-links dataset respectively. In addition, it should be noted that the classifiers' precisions Connection-Strength restriction rates according to friends' ranking positions in the restriction interface. Note that among all friends, who were ranked in the first position in the friends restriction interface, 31.1 % were actually restricted by the SPP users at 500 were 94, 91, and 88 % for the Fake-profiles datasets, Friends-restriction dataset, and All-links dataset respectively. Hence, out of 500 links that were ranked by the RotationForest classifiers as links with the highest likelihood of being restricted by the SPP application users, 470, 455, and 440 links were actually restricted in the Fakeprofiles datasets, Friends-restriction dataset, and All-links dataset respectively.
In order to estimate the classifiers' recommendations precision according to the SPP user's point of view, we also calculated the RotationForest classifier average users precision k, as described in Sect. 4.2.2, on the different datasets for different values of k. 22
The results of this precision at k evaluation are presented in Fig. 10 . It should be noted that the RotationForest classifier presented precision at 10 of 24, 23, and 14 % for the All-links dataset, Fake-profiles datasets, and Friendsrestriction dataset respectively. The RotationForest classifier's results on the All-links dataset indicated that, on average, 2.4 of the user's friends who received the top ten highest probabilities of being restricted among all his or her friends were actually restricted. However, the Rotation-Forest classifier's results on the Friends-restriction dataset indicated, that on average, only 1.4 of the user's friends who received the top ten highest probabilities of being restricted among all his or her friends had actually been restricted.
To obtain an indication of the usefulness of the various features, we also calculated the importance of the different features using WEKA's information gain attribute Fig. 7 Connection-Strength average users precision at k. Note that the heuristic's average users precision at 1 and average users precision at 100 were 33.6 and 11.1 % respectively Fig. 8 Classifier AUCs on the different datasets. Note that the RotationForest classifier received the highest AUC rates on all three datasets 22 In case of the Friends-restriction datasets, we calculated the average users precision for 355 SPP application users only, ensuring they were familiar with the alphabetical interface and had used it to restrict their friends. selection algorithm (see Table 4 ). According to the information gain selection algorithm, the top two most useful features in all three datasets were the Common-Friends feature and the Jaccard's-Coefficient feature. Furthermore, according to the results, there are differences between the features' scores in the different datasets. For example, the Common-Groups-Ratio feature received a value of 0.113 in the Fake-profile dataset and a value of only 0.003 in the Friends-restriction dataset, and the Is-Friend-Profile-Private received a value of 0.056 in the Friends-restriction dataset and a value of only 0.0002 in the All-links dataset. . 9 RotationForest precision at k. The classifiers' precisions at 100 were 98, 91, and 91 % for the Friends-restriction dataset, Fake-profiles dataset, and All-links dataset respectively Fig. 10 RotationForest average users precision at k. It can been seen that the classifiers' average users precisions at 20 were 21, 20, and 14 % for the All-links dataset, Fake-profiles dataset, and Friends-restriction dataset respectively 
Add-on results
The SPP Firefox Add-on was downloaded hundreds of times 23 between June 27 and November 10, 2012. During that time, we succeeded in collecting data pertaining to the number of installed Facebook applications from 1,676 different Facebook users. These data were collected on 21,524 different occasions. Furthermore, we succeeded in collecting SPP users' privacy settings for at least 67 Facebook users on 129 different occasions. 24 By analyzing the collected applications data, we discovered that the number of Facebook applications installed on users' profiles, at the time they initially installed our Add-on, ranged from one installed application to 1,243 installed applications, with an average of 42.266 applications per user. Moreover, according to the installed applications distribution, we can observe that 34.96 % of the users have fewer than ten applications installed on their profiles. However, 30.31 % of the users have at least 40 installed applications, and 10.68 % have more than 100 applications installed on their profiles (see Fig. 11 ).
In addition to calculating the statistics on the number of installed Facebook applications, we also determined through testing whether or not the SPP users had used the Add-on to remove some of their installed Facebook applications. In order to identify such users, we checked the user's installed application numbers a day after the Add-on was initially installed. Our Add-on succeeded in collecting the data of 626 users a day after the Add-on was initially installed. Out of these 626 users, 111 (17.73 %) had removed 1,792 applications, while 149 (23.8 %) users added 192 applications, and 366 (58.47 %) users did not add or remove any applications (see Fig.  12 ). A closer look at the application removal data reveals that, on average, each user of the 111 users removed 34.7 % of all installed applications, and 32 (28.8 %) users removed at least 50 % of all their installed applications (see Fig. 13 ).
If we look at the overall time period of our experiments, June 27 to November 10, 2012, we see that out of 1,676 users, 335 (19.99 %) users decreased the number of installed applications on their profiles. These users removed 5,537 applications with an average of 16.52 application removals per user and a median of seven.
In addition to determining how many applications were removed, we also analyzed how many new applications were installed by each of the Add-on users. To achieve this goal, we first focused on the group of Add-on users who to the best of our knowledge had more applications installed on their profile at the end of the November 10, 2012, than on the day they first installed the Add-on. For this group of users, we calculated how many applications were added to their profiles on average each week. We discovered that out of 1,676 users, 389 (23.2 %) users increased the number of installed applications on their profile ranging from 0.05 to 107.33 new application installations per week (with a median of 0.636 and an average of 1.91).
We also analyzed the distribution of the privacy settings collected from the 67 unique Add-on users (see Table 5 ). Note that 74.62 % of the users had set their default privacy settings to be visible to everyone. Moreover, according to the users' privacy settings, almost all the user information, except Tag-Suggestions, is visible to the user's friends. In addition, we also analyzed the number of Add-on users who had changed their privacy settings during this time period and discovered that according to our logs, 14 Addon users (20.9 %) changed their privacy settings. However, after a short while, the majority of these fourteen users returned to their old, less-restricted privacy settings.
Discussion
Our initial SPP application results presented relatively good performances. Although we defined the Connection-Strength heuristic to be quite simple, it presented remarkable precision. However, due to its relative simplicity, the Connection-Strength heuristic could not present a generic method with high true-positive rates and low false-positive rates for recommending the restriction of links. Following are further insights obtained from analyzing our experimental results.
First, among all tested ensemble and non-ensemble machine learning algorithms, the ensemble algorithms presented superior classification results in terms of AUC and F measure compared to the non-ensemble algorithms. The RotationForest classifiers performed the best on all datasets, with especially good results for an AUC of 0.947, a true-positive rate of 94.1 %, and a false-positive rate of 16 % on the Fake-profiles dataset (see Table 3 ). The classifiers' true-positive and false-positive rates on the Fake-profiles dataset indicate that the RotationForest classifier can be quite helpful for recommending to Facebook users which of their Facebook friends have a high likelihood of being fake. Moreover, the high true-positive rate, which in this case is equivalent to the classifier's recall, 25 indicates that the RotationForest classifier also succeeded in identifying the most restricted profiles in the Fake-profiles dataset. However, the relative high false-positive rate indicates that the RotationForest classifier is not suitable The classifier's true-positive rate is the proportion of links that were classified as restricted to all links which were actually were restricted. Therefore, throughout this study, the classifier's truepositive rate is equivalent to the classifier's recall rate.
for automatically restricting friends' profiles. Nevertheless, we believe that by constructing the classifiers with additional temporal-based features, such as the average number of added friends per day, and additional content-based features, such as the average number of words per post, the false-positive rate can be decreased considerably. Second, although the RotationForest classifiers presented the best results in terms of AUC and F measure, the RotationForest classifiers presented the worst training time results of up to 122.744 s (see Fig. 3 ). Therefore, in cases where we need to train fake profile identification classifiers on frequent time intervals, such as after each time a user restricts one of his or her friends, we will need to use an algorithm with a faster training time. The results presented in Fig. 3 indicate that in cases where training time is of the essence, using the J48 algorithm to construct the classifiers can provide a cost-effective alternative to the Rotation-Forest algorithm; it has a lower AUC but a considerably faster training time.
Third, according to the results, the RotationForest classifiers' average users precision at 1 on the All-links dataset was 21 %; on the Fake-profiles dataset, it was 20 %. These results were lower than the results obtained by the Connection-Strength heuristic, which presented an average users precision at 1 of 34 %. However, the classifiers' average users precision at k for higher k values was nearly the same as the Connection-Strength heuristic's precision at k. For example, the Connection-Strength heuristic average users precision at 20 was 22 %, while the RotationForest classifiers' average users precision at 20 was 21 % on the All-links dataset and 20 % on the Fakeprofiles datasets (see Figs. 7, 10) . Nevertheless, using Ro-tationForest classifiers has two major advantages over the Connection-Strength heuristic: (a) the RotationForest classifiers provide a generic model for links restriction recommendations and can present the restriction probability for each link in the network without the need to compare each link to other links of the same user, as was done in the case of the Connection-Strength heuristic; and (b) utilizing the classifiers' links restriction probability to adjust classification thresholds can greatly increase the classifiers' precision on the account of reducing the classifiers' recall.
Fourth, in contrast to the other classifiers, the classifier that was constructed from the Friends-restriction dataset using the RotationForest algorithm presented a relatively low average users precision at 1 of 14 % (see Fig. 10 ). However, this precision is significantly better than the precision obtained by random guessing, which stands at 4.25 % for the Friends-restriction dataset. We assume that this classifier presented a relatively low performance because the restricted friends in this dataset were mainly real friends, which the SPP users chose to restrict for other reasons. We assume that these reasons cannot be inferred from the features we extracted in the SPP's initial version. We believe that using other types of features, such as features based on sentiment analysis of the users' chat and post messages, can increase the classifier's precision in identifying which real friends the user will probably want to restrict.
Fifth, when the RotationForest classifiers were evaluated on the general scenario of predicting which links to restrict among all users' links, the classifiers presented very high precision rates. For example, the RotationForest classifier that was constructed from Fake-profiles dataset links presented 91 % precision at 100 and 94 % precision at 500 (see Fig. 9 ). Moreover, the RotationForest classifier that was constructed from the Friends-restriction dataset presented impressive precision at 100 of 98 %. These results indicate that the classifiers can be used not only by the social network users, but also by the online social network administrator in order to identify fake profiles among all profiles on the network.
Sixth, according to the information gain results, we can conclude that on all datasets the most useful features were the Common-Friends feature and the Jaccard's-Coefficient feature (see Table 4 ). Additionally, the Is-Friend-Profile-Private was found to be very useful in the case of the Friends-restriction dataset, indicating that friends who have their profile set to be private have a higher likelihood of being restricted. Moreover, according to these results, it is noticeable that the Are-Family and the Tagged-Videos-Number features were not as useful. Removing the extraction of these features in future versions can assist in improving the SPP application run time without significantly affecting the results.
Seventh, the applications statistic results (see Figs. 11, 13) indicate that, in many cases, the installed applications are unwanted or unneeded. Furthermore, our results also uncovered an alarming phenomenon, namely many Facebook users install new applications weekly. According to our results, 23.21 % of the users had increased the number of installed Facebook applications on their profiles with an average number of 1.91 new application installations per week.
Eighth, according to the collected users' privacy statistics, we found that almost all of the examined users' information is available to friends, leaving this information exposed to fake friends (see Table 5 ). In addition, the vast majority of examined users also set their default privacy setting to be accessible by everyone. This result indicates that many users do not protect their personal information whatsoever and leave it exposed for public viewing.
Lastly, our results found that the SPP software has assisted its users in protecting their privacy both by restricting friends and by removing unwanted Facebook applications. However, the SPP software was not successful in prompting users to improve their privacy settings in the majority of cases.
Conclusions
In this study, we have introduced the SPP software with the goal of better protecting a user's privacy in Facebook. We presented in detail the general architecture of the SPP software (see Sect. 3). According to this architecture, the SPP software can be divided into three layers of protection. The first layer helps to restrict the access of a user's friends to personal information. The second layer helps to identify and warn the user about installed Facebook applications, which can violate the user's privacy. The third layer helps the user to adjust his or her privacy settings with one click.
In the initial version of the SPP software, we chose to implement the Connection-Strength heuristic, which was responsible for recommending to the user which of his or her friends to restrict. From our results, we have concluded that the heuristic presented the users with relatively remarkable recommendations. Using these recommendations, the SPP users restricted 31 % of their friends who appeared in the first position (highest potential threat) of the restriction interface. However, the Connection-Strength heuristic did not provide a general method of identifying which of the users' links needed to be restricted.
To create general link restriction recommendation methods, we formed three types of datasets for different friend-restriction scenarios. Using these datasets, we constructed and compared different machine learning algorithms, and we discovered that the RotationForest algorithm presented the best AUC and false-positive rate results, as well as good average users precision at k results. Furthermore, we demonstrated that these classifiers can provide Facebook administrators with a method to help them identify fake profiles in the social network. These classifiers, however, suffered from relatively high falsepositive rates. We believe that the following actions can considerably reduce these false-positive rates: (a) constructing the classifiers using additional types of features, such as content-based and temporal-based features; (b) increasing the classification probability threshold so only users who received high probabilities of being fake will be classified as fake; and (c) calculating the restriction probabilities of several links (instead of one link) for each suspicious profile. We hope to verify these assumptions in future research.
From the statistics we collected in this study, we also discovered that many Facebook users had an alarming number of applications installed on their profiles, and many users continued to install applications, nearly two new applications every week. Fortunately, our SPP Add-on had been used to remove applications, averaging 16.5 removals per user. Furthermore, many Facebook users expose their private information to friends and even to the public. By making users more aware of their vulnerability, we can help protect Facebook users from fake-profile attacks and third-party applications.
In the future, we hope to continue our study and provide an updated version of the SPP Add-on, which will be able to support more web browsers such as Chrome and Internet Explorer. In addition, we plan to not extract less useful features, such as Tagged-Videos-Number, to help improve the SPP application performance. We plan to replace the Connection-Strength heuristic with a machine learning classifier that can provide SPP users with more accurate suggestions on which friends to restrict. We hope that these improvements will assist SPP users in restricting more fake profiles and also increase the size of our classifiers' training set.
This study has several future research directions that could improve the identification of fake profiles in online social networks. One such direction is to extract more complicated topological features, such as the number of communities of each user, and use them to construct better classifiers with lower false-positive rates. In our previous study (Fire et al. 2012c) , we demonstrated that these types of features can assist in identifying fake profiles.
Another possible research direction to help improve the classifiers' performance is to use oversampling techniques, like SMOTE (Chawla et al. 2011) , to handle the dataset imbalance issue instead of the under-sampling techniques we used in this study. We also hope to test the constructed classifiers' performance on different online social networks such as Google? and Twitter. In addition, we would like to evaluate the presented algorithms on a larger dataset with tens of thousands of fake profiles, ideally by collaborating with large online social network operators and evaluating our algorithms directly on their datasets.
Additional research might include exploring using the SPP software as an educating tool. We also hope to ascertain if those users utilizing the SPP software to restrict friends and remove applications have become more aware of their privacy, and as a result, tend to accept fewer friend requests and install fewer applications. In future studies, we would like to perform a deeper analysis on the unique datasets we obtained with the SPP software and extract further insights on connections among Facebook users. Additionally, we intend to utilize unsupervised and semisupervised learning algorithms to develop fake profile identification classifiers. We believe that combining these types of classifiers with the supervised learning classifiers presented in this study may assist in identifying fake profiles with higher precision. Many opportunities await to further improve the security and privacy of those who use online social networks.
Availability
The Social Privacy Protector and parts of its source code are available for download from http://www.socialpro tector.net. The Friend Analyzer Facebook application is available to download from https://apps.facebook.com/ friend_analyzer_app. An anonymized dataset, which contains information regarding the SPP users' numbers of installed Facebook applications over time, is available at http://proj.ise.bgu.ac.il/sns/facebook_applications.html. A video with detailed explanations on how to use the SPP application is available at http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Uf0LQsP4sSs.
